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ABSTRACT
The process of neighborhood establishment in an IPv6 net-
work is made out through the NDP (Neighbor Discovery
Protocol). Using ICMPv6 messages (NS - Neighbor Solicita-
tion and NA - Neighbor Advertisiment) which contains the
IP address to be resolved, is exposed during the exchange
of messages, making communication vulnerable to various
types of attacks. This paper presents a proposal for a safer
neighborhood establishment using the DH and HMAC algo-
rithms. Experiments were performed in virtualized environ-
ments with the objective of analyzing the efficiency of the
modification proposed in the NDP.
1 INTRODUCTION
TheNDP assists IPv6 in several operations on a local network,
such as: neighbors discovery, duplicate addresses detection,
routers discovery, reachability maintenance and physical
addresses resolution. Is assumed that all nodes in an IPv6
network are trusted, becoming a target for many attacks on
computer networks [3], such as: Spoofing, Denial of Service,
Replay attack, Redirection attack and rogue router attack [1].
Over the years some solutions have been proposed, among
the most promising ones, the SeND (Secure Neighbor Dis-
covery). However, it demands high consumption of compu-
tational resources, thus occasionally limiting the use scope
of SeND [4].
This work proposes an improvement to the IPv6 and NDP
protocols, in order to allow a more secure adjacency estab-
lishment process using HMAC (Hash-Base Message Authen-
tication Code) in conjunction with the DH (Diffie-Hellman)
algorithm [2].
2 PROPOSAL
With the use of HMAC in conjunction with DH, the solu-
tion proposes a hash function to be applied in the ICMPv6’s
header target field in an NS message. The Target field con-
tains the IPv6 address to be resolved. Hiding the hashed IP,
it is assumed that if the NS message is intercepted by an
attacker who has not established a secure channel on the
network with the host previously through DH, the attacker
can not falsify the NA response for NS, as it will not know
which IP address is contained in the Target field.
First, there is the key establishment process using DH so
that all hosts on the network have a secret shared between
them. When it is necessary for one host to create a connec-
tion with another to request the MAC address and establish
neighborhood, the host sends an NS message in multicast-
all-nodes in the network. HMAC is used as a hash function
on the IP address contained in the Target field using the
previously established key between the hosts.
Upon receiving the NS, the hosts will compare the pre-
calculated hash of their IP address with the hash contained
in the Target of the received packet. However, only the true
host will authenticate, because it will be the only one that
hash will be equal and the attacker would not know which
IP address to forge because it would have to solve the hash
contained in NS, which would give advantageous time to
the true host of the NS message reply with the NA message
containing it’s MAC address.
2.1 Proposal weaknesses
Despite increasing the security level by hiding the IP address
during the neighborhood establishment process, the proposal
has some weaknesses, among them:
• How the proposal focuses on the NS/NA process, does
not protect against attacks after this message exchange,
besides depending on the DH procedure do not suffer
MitM.
• For the reason of generating a pair of keys between
all hosts on the network, in a large network where
a large number of hosts can join at the same time,
this generation of keys between them can generate an
overhead.
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3 RESULTS
Three virtual machines have been created, all of which are
Linux Debian version 9.6. Was used VMWare ESXi in a server
with eight cores, 32 GB RAM and 1 TeraByte HD. The idea
was that Alice wants to establish neighborhood with Bob
and the Intruder is an attacker in the network who tries to
pass himself as Bob and falsify the answer of Alice's NS with
a false NA.
Our proposal's script needs the following dependencies:
python3, python3-pip, scapy3, and pyDHE. The first part of
the experiments was to know the difference in the use of
computational resources between the normal NDP process
and the NDP process of our proposal. It was used the Collectl
tool in Alice's machine to collect and store performance
data from computers and network equipment. The script
was run 30 times for both the normal NDP process and the
NDP process of our proposal, each time CPU, memory and
network data were collected. After obtaining the data, the
average of the 30 executions was made. The mean of the
results is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Use of Computational Resources
In figure 1 it can be seen that in the proposal CPU usage
was only 9% higher. In memory we can see that the pro-
posal's script consumes 400M more and about the network
we can see that the biggest difference is in the incoming and
outgoing packets, where the proposal consumes almost four
times more of the outgoing packets, it is supposed that this
difference is due to the DH key exchange at the beginning of
the process. This key exchange can also be the explanation
for the increased CPU and memory consumption.
The second part of the experiments was carried out to
test the level of security of the proposal. In the script there
is a function that was created to perform the Man-in-the-
Middle attack. This function monitors network traffic and,
when capturing an ICMPv6 message of type 135 (an NS),
it responds with several NA messages passing through the
target host. The normal NDP process was performed, where
the Intruder pretends to be Bob and Alice accepts this as
true. To view traffic, the Wireshark tool was used, which is
a program that analyzes network traffic.
In contrast, when the same procedure was performed us-
ing the applied proposal, the Intruder did not succeed in
pretending to be Bob, since he could not see the IP address of
Bob that was contained in the NS Target field sent by Alice.
You can see in Figure 2 in the traffic captured by Wireshark,
the NS of the proposal sent by Alice in multicast and the NA
of Bob sent in unicast to Alice. It is also noted that the Target
field does not contain Bob’s IPv6 address, but it's hash.
Figure 2: Print Screen NS/NA
Considering the experiments carried out, it is conjectured
that the proposal obtains a higher level of security compared
to the normal NDP process.
4 CONCLUSION
In the midst of the current situation in which we live in
which technology is becoming more and more present in
society and with the emergence of the Internet of Things,
IPv6 has become a reality.
In the literature, many works point out problems related
to the process of neighborhood discovery of IPv6 in conjunc-
tion with the NDP. In view of this problem, this work is a
more secure example of neighborhood establishment in IPv6
networks. Hiding the IP during the Neighborhood Discovery,
although it does not solve all the problems related to the
NDP, increases the security level of the process and hinders
some attacks, as demonstrated in the experiments, meeting
the premise of the proposal.
In future works will be used Software Defined Networking
(SDN) to solve the weaknesses presented. The idea is a virtual
switch for key management, that is, all hosts will have a key
with the switch before establishing the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, thus protecting against the Man-in-the-Middle
attack during this process. To avoid network overhead, a
virtual switch can allocate more resources when needed.
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